

17 August 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Information Services

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Chief, Classification Review Division

SUBJECT: Request from CDC/SR for Temporary Relief
from Top Secret Control Procedures for
FRUS Material

1. As you may recall, I received a phone call late in July from Larry Pickering in which he repeated his plea for temporary relief from Top Secret document controls in the preparation of volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) now being readied for review. This request for a temporary moratorium on the special storage, inventorying, and control requirements normally required for Top Secret documents would apply only to the proposed 1955-57 and 1958-60 volumes of FRUS which have already been compiled by the Historical Office (HO) and given to CDC/SR for review. CDC has received permission from NSC and DOD (Art Van Cook) to apply a temporary moratorium for material of interest to those agencies. Starting with the 1961-63 compilations, any Top Secret documents selected for inclusion in the compilation and determined to be of CIA origin or interest would be forwarded to the Agency for review before their inclusion in the compilation.

2. In response to my questions in an exploratory conversation on 5 August, Larry opined that most of these documents had been selected from State files. Some could have been obtained from the presidential libraries. In a conversation with our own History Staff on 6 August, I learned that the procedure for selecting the library documents, as far as the Agency is involved, goes about as follows: State's Historical Office sends the Agency (the History Staff) a letter requesting permission to review our documents on a given subject at the presidential library; having received our permission, the HO representative selects the documents in which he is interested; the library sends copies of those documents to the History Staff for review; the History Staff checks with the appropriate releasing authority within the Agency to determine whether the document may be released and then replies to the library accordingly.

3. The problem lies in the fact that the 1955-57 and 1958-60 compilations have already been pulled together by HO and given to CDC/SR, the Top Secret documents are buried within them, and it would be a terrible burden to have to hold up the review to locate these documents and place them under control. I did not get the

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
figure for the 1958-60 compilation, but the 1955-57 series, for example, amounts to 270,000 pages, which gives you an idea of the size of the problem. I tried to get from Larry some idea of the number or percentage of Top Secret documents in those collections but he said it was too difficult to judge. He did, however, have an inventory of the collection on Indonesia which had gone into the review stage. It indicated that there were 30 Top Secret documents out of approximately 900 pages, none of which was of CIA origin. An inventory of material on Central American countries indicated that there were nine Top Secret documents out of approximately 1500 pages, only one of which was a document originated by the Agency.

4. Larry advised that, given our approval, the process would be as follows. All State Department personnel having access to this material would have a Top Secret clearance. No one with a Secret clearance would have access to the compilation until the review by CDC/SR takes place and all Top Secret material is identified and removed or sanitized. Also, no material would be released from the Department to any other agency until it was reviewed and the Top Secret material identified, inventoried, and controlled. In the meantime the material would be handled as Secret; i.e., it would be stored in three-way combination safes, it would not be inventoried, nor would it be signed for as it passed from one party to the next. If the reviewing officer in CDC/SR surfaces a Top Secret document as the material for a given volume comes under review, and believes it cannot be sanitized for inclusion in FRUS, he will remove it from the compilation. If he thinks, however, that the document can possibly be sanitized in some manner, he will mark it for review by the agency concerned. At that point the Top Secret material surfaced by the review will be provided full control according to standard Top Secret control requirements.

5. My recommendation is that we allow them the temporary suspension of Top Secret control that they are requesting, for the 1955-57 and 1958-60 series only. We should advise CDC/SR and HO that we will want to work out control procedures for handling Top Secret material to be selected for the 1961-63 compilation and future compilation.

6. In closing, it's worth noting that Larry advised me they are considering eliminating any documents concerning covert action (not further defined) from future series of the FRUS, on the basis of the problems it causes in obtaining clearance, and the fact that no matter how much is included, it is never enough as far as some customers of the FRUS series are concerned. The aim would be to keep the FRUS series as more of a history of straight diplomatic policy to the extent that can be accomplished. This could, of course, have a significant impact on our manpower requirements for reviewing these series.


7. I will advise Larry by letter as soon as I have your decision regarding the recommendation in paragraph 5, unless you would prefer to advise Tom Ainsworth directly.



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